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ABSTRACT
Various theories of market failures and targeting motivate the promotion of entrepreneurship training
programs throughout the world. Using data from the largest randomized control trial ever conducted
on entrepreneurship training, we examine the validity of such motivations and find that training does
not have strong effects (in either relative or absolute terms) on those most likely to face credit or human
capital constraints, or labor market discrimination. On the other hand, training does have a relatively
strong short-run effect on business ownership for those unemployed at baseline, but not at other horizons
or for other outcomes. On average, training increases short-run business ownership and employment,
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Governments and donors spend billions of dollars subsidizing entrepreneurship training 
programs around the world. In the United States alone, there exist more than 1,000 SBA-
subsidized Small Business Development Centers (SBDC) and 762 not-for-profit programs 
providing self-employment training and other assistance.
1 Arguments for subsidizing training are 
manifold, and span theories of allocative and/or redistributive frictions in credit, labor, insurance, 
and human capital markets. But these arguments have been difficult to evaluate empirically due 
to classic endogeneity problems from selection into training. Thus, surprisingly little is known 
about the overall effectiveness of entrepreneurship training and whether this training mitigates 
market or redistributive frictions. 
We address these limitations with an analysis of the largest and broadest randomized trial on 
entrepreneurship training ever conducted in the United States or elsewhere in the world – the 
Project Growing America through Entrepreneurship (GATE).
2 Project GATE was a longitudinal 
study conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor and the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
                                                            
1 SBDCs exist in all 50 states, and are administered and funded through partnerships between the SBA 
and public colleges and not-for-profits. See http://www.sba.gov/content/small-business-development-
centers-sbdcs for a directory of SBDCs, Aspen Institute/FIELD (2012) for information on non-profit 
programs, and European Commission (2010) for a description of programs in the European Union. 
2  The only previous randomized trial conducted in the United States was a smaller demonstration 
experiment of self-employment training for U.I. recipients in Washington and Massachusetts (Benus et al 
(1994)). That study found positive program impacts on self-employment, total earnings, and job creation, 
but in addition to training the assistance program allowed for concurrent U.I. benefit payments and a 
lump-sum benefit payment. A few recent experiments of the effects of business training on micro-
entrepreneurs have been conducted in developing countries (Field, Jaychandran, and Pande 2010; Berge, 
Bjorvatn, and Tungooden 2011; Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar 2011; Karlan and Valdivia 2011; Karlan, 
Knight, and Udry 2012; Gine and Mansuri 2011). These studies have generally found some positive, but 
mixed, results. The results of this literature may be informative, but not generalizable, to the developed 
country context where the content of entrepreneurship training, education level of trainees, and types of 
businesses being created are very different, and where formal labor, financial and business markets are 
more open and accessible. For related research using non-randomized approaches to identifying effects of 
self-employment training programs, see, e.g., Kosanovich and Fleck (2001), Rodriguez-Planas (2010), 
Almeida and Galasso (2010), and for random and quasi-experimental approaches to studying 
entrepreneurship education for college and younger students see Huber, Sloof and van Praag (2012) and 
Oosterbeek, van Praag and Ijsselstein (2010). 2 
 
in which free entrepreneurship training was randomly offered to individuals interested in starting 
or improving a business. More than four thousand individuals applied for a limited number of 
slots for free entrepreneurship training services at 14 different SBDCs and non-profit 
community-based organizations (CBOs) located across 7 cities in 3 states. SBDCs and CBOs are 
the predominant providers of entrepreneurship training services in the U.S. market. Subjects 
assigned to the treatment group were offered an array of best-practice training services whereas 
subjects assigned to the control group were not offered any free services. Follow-up surveys at 6 
and 18, and 60 months after treatment assignment yield a rich set of outcome measures. The 60-
month follow-up survey provides rare measures of long-run outcomes. 
We use the GATE experiment to conduct a comprehensive examination of the impacts of 
entrepreneurship training. We provide new estimates for additional outcomes beyond those 
reported in the original evaluation report, estimates that control for non-compliance in the 
treatment and control groups, non-experimental estimates from the control group to demonstrate 
potential biases, and estimates of distributional differences in business sales and employment.
3 
We also test hypotheses regarding the rationales for training interventions by examining several 
                                                            
3 The final evaluation report for Project GATE submitted to the U.S. Department of Labor found that the 
program increased business ownership in the short-run, and had positive effects on business longevity and 
job creation over the full sample period (Benus et al. 2009). Unemployment insurance recipients at 
baseline were found to experience larger positive effects. The report concluded "that the benefits of 
Project GATE exceed its costs," and "DOL should initiate a new self-employment training program 
similar to Project GATE in all states." The Department of Labor recently funded a new round of GATE 
programs in three new states and one previous state "because of the success of the original Project 
GATE" (U.S. Department of Labor 2010). 
However, the final evaluation report made several methodological decisions with which we disagree. 
It excludes business partnerships between treatment and control group members (120 members), reports 
estimates for several business outcomes that condition on post-treatment ownership status, does not 
sufficiently address differential attrition between the treatment and control groups (treated subjects were 
4-5 percentage points more likely to complete the follow-up surveys), relies on several estimates that may 
suffer from recall bias, and uses a hot-deck procedure to impute missing values for outcome measures. 
 3 
 
additional heterogeneous treatment effects and their implications for whether and why markets 
fail for specific reasons and thereby justify training subsidies. 
Our estimates of average treatment effects across the entire sample suggest that GATE had 
limited impacts on ultimate outcomes. GATE significantly increased the likelihood of business 
ownership at 6-months (5pp on a base of 0.36) but not thereafter.
4 There is a more modest 
increase in overall employment at 6-months (3pp), suggesting some substitution between self-
employment and wage/salary employment. We find no evidence, however, of average treatment 
effects on other outcomes, including measures of business performance, household income, and 
work satisfaction at any horizon (6-, 18-, or 60-months). We also show that the estimates are not 
overly sensitive to reasonable assumptions about how attrition affects the composition of the 
treatment vs. control groups. Overall, the only significant full-sample average treatment effects, 
across a very large number of tests are on 6-month business ownership and 6-month employment 
status. 
These null effect estimates on more ultimate outcomes are not simply due to a weak 
treatment (lack of compliance, quality, intensity, etc.). We find that the GATE assignment to 
treatment produced a 136 percent short-term increase and a 45 percent long-term increase in the 
amount of training received. Recipients reported the training as useful in follow-up surveys, and 
the treatment group was 11-13 percentage points more likely to create a business plan and 2-6 
percentage points more likely to start a business than the control group. 
We also provide novel results on heterogeneous treatment effects, using these interactions to 
shed light on the empirical importance of various rationales offered for training subsidies. Credit 
constraints are one rationale offered for training subsidies: if training is valuable but potential 
                                                            
4 The point estimates fall from 5pp at the 6-month follow-up, to 2pp at the 18-month follow-up, to 0-1pp 
at the 60-month follow-up. 4 
 
recipients lack the liquidity to pay for it, offering low-cost training may be a cost-effective way 
(compared to, say, subsidizing lending) to improve access. Training may also improve access by 
providing information, special training, and assistance in finding capital. Labor market 
discrimination is a second rationale for training subsidies: if minorities face greater 
discrimination from employers than from customers or lenders, then subsidizing training may be 
a relatively efficient method of helping minorities overcome barriers to starting businesses and 
avoid future discrimination in the labor market. A third rationale for training subsidies is human 
and managerial capital constraints: if education or managerial labor markets do not function well, 
then low-cost training may improve efficiency or efficiently redistribute to the most-affected 
parties. Unemployment insurance frictions are a fourth rationale for training subsidies: training 
may be a relatively efficient way to insure against job loss by providing recipients with 
incentives to work by creating a job for themselves (and perhaps others). 
We do not find evidence supporting the credit constraint, discrimination, and human capital 
constraint arguments. We do find limited support for the unemployment insurance friction 
hypothesis: the GATE treatment effect on business ownership at 6-months is significantly greater 
for those who were initially unemployed compared with those who were employed at baseline. 
But, we do not find any other evidence of relatively strong effects for the unemployed, nor do we 
find any evidence of lasting effects for the unemployed.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides more details on GATE, 
including its research design and implementation, the nature of the training services received by 
subjects, and GATE’s average impacts on business planning and starts. Section 3 presents our 
results on more ultimate outcomes of interest, distributional effects on business size, compliance 
and local average treatment effects, non-experimental estimates, and a bounds analysis 5 
 
addressing differential attrition. This section also presents estimates of heterogeneous treatment 
effects to test hypotheses about the (redistributive) efficiency of self-employment training. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Growing America through Entrepreneurship (Project GATE) Experiment 
A. Evaluation and Treatment Design 
Growing America through Entrepreneurship (Project GATE) was an evaluation designed and 
implemented by the U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Small Business Association. The GATE 
experiment is the largest-ever randomized evaluation of entrepreneurship training and assistance 
involving more than four thousand participants. It differs from earlier large-scale evaluations in 
the United States because its training was marketed to any individual interested in starting or 
growing a business, and not limited to individuals receiving unemployment or welfare benefits.
5 
GATE was administered between September 2003 and July 2005 in seven cities of varying 
sizes: Philadelphia; Pittsburgh; Minneapolis/St. Paul; Duluth, Minnesota; Virginia, Minnesota; 
Portland, Maine; Lewiston, Maine; and Bangor, Maine (see Bellotti et al. 2006 for more details). 
Both urban and rural populations were served by the sites. Fourteen different organizations 
provided the GATE training, including SBA-funded Small Business Development Centers and 
non-profit community-based organizations.
6 All of the providers and their programs had been 
                                                            
5  Demonstration programs in Washington and Massachusetts starting in 1989, and Self-Employment 
Assistance programs in several states starting in 1993, targeted unemployment insurance recipients. The 
Self-Employment Investment Demonstration, implemented from 1988 to 1992 in five states, targeted 
AFDC recipients. 
6 The Aspen Institute lists more than 750 non-profit programs providing training, technical assistance, 
and/or loans to entrepreneurs in the United States. SBDCs exist in all 50 states, and more than one million 
small businesses and entrepreneurs utilize these resources. The SBA provided $128 million in FY 2009 in 
grant funding for these programs. 6 
 
operating prior to the experiment, and thus collectively represent the existing market for 
entrepreneurship training in the United States. 
Training providers marketed GATE to a broad group of potential entrepreneurs with an 
extensive campaign that included public service announcements, paid advertisements, and flyers 
and posters at One-Stop Career Centers. Individuals interested in receiving training had to first 
attend an orientation meeting at one of the 21 participating One-Stop Career Centers in the seven 
GATE cities. Anyone attending the orientation meeting was then eligible to apply for GATE by 
completing a nine-page application form with questions on demographics, work and business 
experience, and the individual’s current business or new business idea.  Applicants were 
informed that “GATE does not have space for everyone” and that a “lottery or random drawing 
will decide whether you will be able to enter the program.” 
Program coordinators reviewed applications for completeness and then randomly assigned all 
complete applications to the treatment or control group with equal probability. The treatment 
group was offered an array of free services. Program administrators informed the control group 
that the GATE program did not have the capacity to offer them services, and administrators 
offered no referrals to other (free) services either. Individuals in both groups were notified that 
they would be mailed follow-up surveys in 6, 18, and 60 months. 
The array of GATE services offered to the treatment group began with a one-on-one 
assessment meeting to determine an individual’s specific training needs. Then training was 
provided by experienced business consultants in classroom and/or one-on-one settings. 
Classroom offerings targeted a variety of general and specialized topics at different experience 7 
 
levels.
7  One-on-one counseling was designed to provide advice that was customized to the 
individual’s experience, capability, circumstances, and opportunities. GATE “training” was 
always offered as this bundle/menu of services, and hence we cannot disentangle the effects of 
its different components. The total cost of providing training to GATE recipients was estimated 
to be $1,321 per person. 
 
B. Sample Characteristics and External Validity 
For the study, 4,197 individuals completed the application process and were randomly 
assigned to the treatment (N=2,094) or control (N=2,103) group. Among participants, 19 percent 
were self-employed and 39 percent were receiving unemployment insurance (U.I.) benefits at the 
time of the application. GATE participants do not differ substantially from the U.S. self-
employed population in demographic characteristics such as race, nativity, gender, age, and 
education (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010). Given these characteristics and GATE’s mass 
marketing, GATE treatment effects plausibly apply to a broad population of entrepreneurs and 
potential entrepreneurs who are interested in training. GATE’s filters, which included attending 
the orientation session and completing the application, imply that its external validity is 
questionable for populations more marginally interested in training; e.g., for those who would 
only participate if some other benefit was conditioned on participation or if particularly 
aggressive marketing techniques were employed. 
The training and providers in the GATE experiment are representative of the current market 
for entrepreneurship training. As noted above, GATE training was provided by 14 different 
SBDCs and CBOS, which are the primary providers of subsidized self-employment training in 
                                                            
7 Introductory courses cover subjects such as legal structure, business plans, and marketing. Intermediate 
and advanced courses cover subjects including managing growth, legal risks, and personnel issues. More 
specialized courses covered, e.g., accounting, information technology, and web-based businesses. 8 
 
the United States. These providers and their programs existed prior to the experiment, and the 
sites participating in GATE are located across rural and urban areas (7 cities of varying sizes), 
and 3 states. 
 
C. Randomization Integrity and Differential Attrition 
Table 1 starts by comparing mean baseline characteristics across the treatment and control 
groups. Random assignment was not stratified by site, but each site produced roughly 50-50 
assignments nevertheless. Among the numerous baseline characteristics measured in the 
application, only one, age, is statistically different between treatment and control. One would 
expect to find one or two significant differences by chance, and the magnitude of the age 
difference is small (< 1 year). In any case, when estimating treatment effects we present results 
both without covariates as well as with controls for a large set of detailed baseline characteristics. 
Table 1 also compares treatment and control completion rates and baseline characteristics for 
each of the three follow-up surveys. Control group members are significantly more likely to 
attrit: the completion rate differs by 4-5 percentage points, on a base of 56-80 percent, for each 
follow-up wave. However, despite differential attrition rates overall, we do not find differences 
in the observable composition of the treatment versus control groups, based on characteristics 
observed in the baseline. The number of significant differences is about what one would expect 
to find by chance, and the magnitude of these differences is small. More formally, in a regression 
of follow-up survey completion on baseline characteristics, treatment status, and baseline 
characteristics interacted with treatment status, the F-tests on the interaction variable coefficients 
have p-values of 0.214 for Wave 1, 0.823 for Wave 2, and 0.091 for Wave 3. Despite this 9 
 
reassurance, we investigate how treatment effects might be biased if there is in fact differential 
attrition (e.g., on unobservables) in Section 3.F below. 
 
D. Empirical Strategy 
Our main specification for estimating average treatment effects uses simple means 
comparisons or OLS intent-to-treat estimates, conditional on all of the baseline covariates shown 
in Table 1. When estimating heterogeneous treatment effects we add a set of interactions 
between baseline covariates and treatment assignment to the model.  
 
E. Treatment Effects on Services Received, Business Planning, and Trying Business Ownership 
Given that the control group was not restricted from obtaining training elsewhere, it is 
important to examine whether and how the GATE treatment actually changed the use of training 
and business planning. 
Table 2 shows that the treatment group was an estimated 37 percentage points more likely to 
receive any training in the 6 months following random assignment than the control group.
8 The 
first 6 months after random assignment was the most intensive period for receiving training, with 
less training received during the subsequent 12 month period (i.e. between Wave 1 and Wave 2) 
and the last 42 month period (i.e. between Wave 2 and Wave 3). 
The treatment group also received more than twice the number of hours of training by the 
first follow-up wave. The difference in training received is 9 hours at Wave 1 and 8.5 hours 
                                                            
8 Examining who receives entrepreneurship training, we find only a few characteristics that predict take-
up of training by each follow-up wave. Focusing on the main effects we find some evidence that African 
Americans and the more educated are more likely to receive training (see Appendix Table 1). Examining 
differential take up between the treatment and control groups, we find only a few significant differences. 
F-tests for differential take up for all covariates do not reject equality in any of the three follow-up waves. 10 
 
summing across waves.
9 The extra hours of instructional time are likely to result in substantially 
more "homework" time. Consider business planning as an example of one of the main types of 
content that is covered in training. Although students learn or receive guidance in the classroom 
or one-on-one counseling on how to write a business plan, the actual writing, research and 
calculations for the business plan are done elsewhere, and thus not reported as “training” hours 
(estimates reported below indicate that the treatment group is much more likely to write a 
business plan than the control group). Among those who received any training, the treatment 
group received on average 19.2 hours of training in the first 6 months, which is roughly two-
thirds the instructional time for a 5-unit college course over a quarter. 
Follow-up survey responses also indicate that GATE participants were satisfied with services 
(Appendix Table 2). 51.7 percent of GATE recipients reported that “the overfull usefulness” of 
the services received was “very useful”, with 33.7 percent responding “somewhat useful”. Most 
recipients of GATE training responded that services helped “a lot” or “somewhat” with at least 
one specific aspect of the business or business planning (e.g., marketing strategy, accounting, 
networking, information technology). The treatment group reports greater satisfaction overall, 
and for each of the training aspects, than control group trainees (who obtained non-GATE 
training of their own accord). These responses, along with the experience, best-practice 
approach, and scale of the service providers (e.g. the SBA-funded SBDCs), suggest that any null 
effects are not due to low-quality training that is particular to GATE. 
  Table 3 shows that GATE affected some business planning and practice outcomes as 
well. Treated individuals were 13 percentage points more likely to have written a business plan 
by Wave 1, and this difference persists over time. This translates, to a relatively small degree, 
                                                            
9 Drexler et al. (2011) find substantial effects on business practices and outcomes from only a few hours 
of extra training among microcredit users in the Dominican Republic. 11 
 
into participants trying business ownership: there are significant differences in the likelihood of  
of ever having owned a business of 4 and 5 percentage points at the 6- and 18-month follow-ups. 
By 60-months the difference shrinks to 2.5 percentage points, with a p-value of 0.135. We do not 
find any differences in loan applications, however, on a low base; e.g., only 6 percent of the 
treatment and control groups applied for a business loan by Wave 1. 
 
3. Treatment Effects on More Ultimate Outcomes  
A.  Average Effects on Business Ownership and Performance 
We start by examining the average impacts on business ownership at each follow-up wave. 
Table 4 reports estimates. For the treatment group, 40.1 percent are self-employed business 
owners at the 6-month follow-up survey. This rate of business ownership is 5.2 percentage points 
higher (conditional on baseline covariates) than for the control group. At the 18-month follow-
up, the treatment effect point estimate remains positive, but the difference of 2.2 percentage 
points is smaller (control group mean = 0.41) and no longer statistically significant. Sixty months 
after random assignment, the treatment and control groups have nearly identical levels of 
business ownership.
10 The positive effects of entrepreneurship training on business ownership 
appear to die out over time.
11  Confirming this interpretation, we find a similar decline in 
treatment effects over time if we condition the sample in all waves to only those who respond to 
                                                            
10 We also find very similar average total number of businesses owned between the treatment and control 
groups over the 60-month sample period. 
11 The results are not due to the influence of side or casual businesses, or disguised unemployment (Carter 
and Sutch 1994). Defining business ownership with 30 or more hours worked per week, we find lower 
rates of business ownership, but similar treatment-control differences: the treatment group has a 4.2 
percentage point higher rate of full-time business ownership than the control group at Wave 1, dropping 
to 1.8 percentage points at Wave 2, and dropping to essentially zero at Wave 3. We also restrict business 
ownership to only include businesses reporting positive sales at each survey wave to remove non-serious 
self-employment activities. Again, we find similar results. 12 
 
the Wave 3 survey. Thus, the pattern of estimated effects on business ownership is not due to 
changes in sample composition. 
Before examining additional outcomes, we briefly examine treatment effects on the dynamics 
of business entry and exit in Appendix Table 3. Given that the treatment and control groups start 
with roughly equal ownership rates (Table 1), any differences in business ownership rates at each 
of the follow-up survey waves are due to differences in business creation rates, differences in 
business exit rates, or both.
12 The second panel of Appendix Table 3 shows that, conditional on 
not owning a business at baseline, treatment group members were far more likely to have started 
a business 6 months later. This effect dissipates over time. The third panel of Appendix Table 3 
shows that, conditional on owning a business at baseline, we do not find any significant 
differences in exit rates. Thus the treatment effect is driven primarily by a difference in business 
starts, not exits. 
Overall, the estimates indicate that entrepreneurship training increased average levels of 
business ownership in the short-run. Entrepreneurship training appears to have drawn new 
people into starting businesses but did not increase the survival rates of pre-existing businesses.
13 
The effects of entrepreneurship training disappear in the long run, however. This implies that 
the marginal businesses produced by entrepreneurship training do not survive in the 
medium/long-run.
14  Indeed, examining the treatment effects on business sales and hiring 
                                                            
12 See Evans and Leighton (1989), Fairlie (1999), and Carrasco (1999) for more discussion and empirical 
estimates of the relationships between self-employment entry, exit and steady-state rates. 
13 Using information on start and stop dates for all businesses owned between survey dates, we find no 
evidence of treatment effects on total length of time of business ownership. This finding contrasts with 
the finding of longer business longevity found in the final evaluation report, however, that estimate of 
business survival conditions on the first business started after random assignment (Benus et al. 2009). 
14 Treatment effects do not vary with local economic conditions. We estimate specifications that include 
the unemployment rate, and treatment interacted with the unemployment rate (with unemployment 
varying by MSA and year/month), and find no evidence of heterogeneity conditional on underlying 
unemployment in the local economy. 13 
 
employees (Table 4), we find no significant effects, suggesting that the marginal businesses had 
low levels of sales and generally did not hire employees. 
The positive Wave 1 average treatment effect on short-run business ownership is not 
accompanied by positive average treatment effects on business sales or the likelihood of having 
an employee. Nor do we find significant treatment effects on sales or employees at longer 
horizons. Note that these results do not condition on business ownership, and thus capture the 
treatment’s overall impact on sales and hiring employees. The results for employment do not 
differ when we change the focus from having an employee to the number of employees 
(Appendix Table 4). Results are similar for other measures of business performance such as 
profits and a summary index that standardizes and aggregates across several measures of 




B.  Effects on Firm Size Distribution? 
Next we explore whether the average treatment effect analysis might obscure important 
effects on the firm size distribution. In particular, training may have spurred the creation of a few 
very successful businesses which may have in turn led to large local economic impacts. We 
focus here on long-run (Wave 3: 60-month) outcomes, for treatment vs. control, and for both all 
businesses and businesses started post-treatment. 
We start by simply examining the distribution of sales and employment for businesses 
created by the treatment and control groups in Table 5 (Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6). We also report 
the unconditional distributions for all individuals in the treatment and control groups (Columns 1 
and 4), but note that the differences in the distributions between treatment and control groups are 
                                                            
15 The business outcome summary index actually shows a small negative treatment effect in the long-run. 14 
 
similar because the percent of individuals who do not own a business is essentially the same for 
the 60-month follow-up. Both the sales and employee distributions show that our sample has 
fewer large businesses than the United States as a whole. This is partly due to the five-year study 
period: the distributions are more similar when we compare our sample to U.S. businesses 
created in the past 5 years (Column 8). Focusing on the treatment vs. control comparisons, we do 
not find that businesses created by the treatment group are more likely to be very successful than 
businesses created by the control group. In fact, we find that a higher percentage of businesses 
owned by the control group have sales of $500,000 or more. The treatment-control difference, 
however, is less clear when we focus on other sales level cutoffs or on high levels of 
employment. We do not find a significant difference between the full treatment and control 
distributions reported in Table 5 using a chi-square test. 
To more formally test whether average treatment effects hide important differential effects 
across the distribution of sales, we also estimate regressions for the probability of creating 
businesses at various cutoffs above $100,000 and 10 employees using the full Wave 3 sample.
16 
We find no treatment effects at any of these cutoffs (results not reported in tables, but available 
upon request). Finally, we estimate quantile regressions for sales and employees starting with the 
75th percentile and incrementing up by 5 percentile points to the 95
th percentile. Again, we find 
no evidence of treatment effects at any of these quantiles. Overall, we do not find evidence that 
entrepreneurship training increased the likelihood of creating high-revenue or high-employment 




16 For example, the dependent variable equals 1 if the person owns a business with sales of $100,000 or 
more and zero otherwise; i.e., the zero group includes non-business owners and low-sales business 
owners. 15 
 
C. Average Effects on Earnings from the Business 
  Although business earnings and income are more difficult to measure precisely, we also 
estimate treatment effects on these outcomes. The follow-up surveys provide information on 1) 
how much the owner paid him/herself in regular salary from the business, and 2) how much the 
owner received in other income payments such as bonuses, profit distributions, or owner's draw 
from the business. Information is also available on the start and stop dates of all of the businesses 
owned between each survey wave. Although there is a fair amount of missing information, these 
measures can be combined to estimate the total earnings and income from all businesses owned 
between survey waves.
17 Appendix Table 4 reports estimates. We find no evidence of positive 
treatment effects. In fact, the point estimates for treatment effects for all three waves are 
negative. 
  Another method for measuring business earnings that reduces problems with missing 
values and recall bias is to use only the most recently owned business (including businesses 
owned at the survey date). Appendix Table 4 reports estimates. Using this measure we also do 
not find any evidence of positive treatment effects. 
  In contrast to these results, the final evaluation report for Project GATE (Benus et al. 
2009) found positive estimates for total business earnings except for Wave 1, and a total 
treatment/control difference of $1,128 from combining all waves (although not statistically 
significant). The positive benefit/cost conclusion reached in the final evaluation report essentially 
hinges on this finding and the finding of 170 more full-time jobs created by the treatment 
group.
18 Our analysis of the GATE Project data, however, provides no evidence of a positive 
                                                            
17 Among study participants reporting owning a business between survey waves, we find that 16 to 21 
percent are missing a value for at least one component needed to calculate total business earnings. 
18 The actual estimated benefit/cost to society calculated in the report is $-1,891, but arguments are made 
that underreporting of business earnings could make the estimated positive business earnings effect larger, 16 
 
business earnings treatment effect (in fact the point estimates for each wave are negative) or 
evidence of positive effects on hiring employees. Although we cannot replicate the analysis 
conducted in the report to identify the exact causes of the discrepancy, we suspect that the hot-
deck imputations, exclusion of treatment/control partnerships, and sample weighting procedure 
are each partly responsible.
19  
 
D. Average Effects on Overall Employment, Household Income, and Work Satisfaction 
Returning to Table 4, we also estimate treatment effects on broader outcomes: the likelihood 
of being employed (wage/salary work or business ownership), household income, and work 
satisfaction (which we use as a proxy for potential non-pecuniary benefits of employment or self-
employment).
20   The positive 6-month effect on employment suggests that the business 
ownership effect does not fully crowd-out wage/salary work: the two point estimates (on 
business ownership, and employment) suggest about 50 percent crowd-out. Similar to the 
business ownership effect, the effect on overall employment dissipates over time. For income 





and that higher treatment group job creation (which is not included in the calculation) could improve the 
final benefit/cost estimate (Benus et al. 2009). 
19 The final evaluation report used a hot-deck procedure to impute all missing values for start and stop 
dates and earnings from each business owned during the sample period. It also excluded all 
treatment/control business partnerships, and used sample weighting procedures to adjust for non-response 
to follow-up surveys. In sensitivity analysis presented in an appendix in the report, estimates of treatment 
effects on total business earnings over the sample period became noticeably smaller when removing each 
of these procedures (which were conducted separately, but not together). 
20 See, for example, Hamilton (2000) and Kawaguchi (2004).  
21 We also estimate treatment effects on total earnings by combining separately reported business earnings 
and wage/salary earnings (as opposed to direct reports of total household income). We do not find any 
significant treatment effects on this measure either. Nor do we find any significant effects on reliance on 
public assistance. 17 
 
E. Compliance and Local Average Treatment Effects 
To gauge how much larger treatment estimates are when estimating the effects of receiving 
entrepreneurship training (i.e. “treatment-on-the-treated” or local average treatment effects), 
instead of estimating the effects of being offered free entrepreneurship training (i.e. “intent-to-
treat” effects), we estimate instrumental variables regressions. As reported in Table 2, 18.8 
percent of the treatment group did not receive any entrepreneurship training in the first 6 months 
after random assignment, and 44.0 percent of the control group received at least some 
entrepreneurship training in the 6 months after random assignment. To account for both types of 
non-compliance and estimate the effects of receiving entrepreneurship training on business 
outcomes, we estimate the following two-stage regression. The first-stage regression for the 
probability of receiving any entrepreneurship training is: 
(3.1) Ei = ω + γXi + πTi + ui. 
The second-stage regression for the outcome of interest, y, is: 
(3.2) yi = α + βXi + ΔE ෡i + εi, 
where Xi includes baseline characteristics, Ti is the treatment indicator, E ෡i is the predicted value 
of entrepreneurship training from (3.1), and ui and εi are error terms.  Δ provides an estimate of 
the local average treatment effect (LATE). 
The IV estimates are reported in Appendix Table 5 for the six main outcomes reported in 
Table 4. As expected given the non-compliance rates, the point estimates are generally scaled up 
by a factor of 2 to 3 over the “intent-to-treat” estimates reported in Table 4. None of our 
statistical inferences change. The LATE estimates indicate that receiving entrepreneurship 
training increases business ownership by 13.5 percentage points and overall employment by 7 
percentage points at Wave 1. There is no strong evidence of effects on long-term business 18 
 
ownership or other outcomes. Because most of the ITT estimates are close to zero the "scaled 
up" LATE estimates also tend to be close to zero. 
Appendix Table 5 also reports estimates of non-experimental correlations between receiving 
entrepreneurship training and our key outcomes, to compare to the LATE estimates. For these 
regressions we include only the control group sample, and control for the rich set of baseline 
characteristics reported in Table 1. For most of the business outcomes, we find large and positive 
significant conditional correlations with entrepreneurship training. These estimates, which may 
be subject to selection bias, are substantially larger and more likely to be statistically significant 
than the LATE estimates from the experiment. They demonstrate the potential problems with 
estimating the effects of entrepreneurship training using non-experimental data. Even with 
detailed controls for baseline household income level, self-employment status, health problems, 
work experience in a family business, credit history, unemployment insurance receipt, employer-
provided health insurance, personality traits, and standard demographic controls, non-
experimental estimates may be strongly upwardly biased. 
 
F. Exploring the Impact of Differential Attrition on the Estimates 
Although we do not find strong evidence of differential attrition based on observables in 
Section 2.C above, or that treatment effect estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of controls for 
baseline characteristics (Table 4), follow-up survey response rates are higher in the treatment 
group for each of the follow-up waves, raising the concern that attrition may be correlated with 
unobserved heterogeneity in outcomes as well. To investigate whether differential attrition might 
have a large effect on the results we follow two different approaches. First, we estimate 
regressions for our main set of outcomes using the predicted probability of attrition as a sample 
weight. The full set of baseline controls are used to estimate these predicted probabilities. This 19 
 
technique places more weight on survivors who look like attriters, in an attempt to compensate 
for the attriters’ absence. The estimates are robust to using these weights (Table 6 vs. Table 4). 
Second, we conduct a bounds analysis using various assumptions about the treatment effects 
for attriters, in the spirit of Horowitz and Manski (2000) and Lee (2002; 2009). Table 7’s 
Column 4 reproduces the relevant average treatment effect estimate from Table 4. Following 
Kling et al. (2007) and Karlan and Valdivia (2011), we impute to the lower (upper) bound the 
mean minus (plus) a specified standard deviation multiple of the observed treatment group 
distribution to the non-responders in the treatment group, and the mean plus (minus) the same 
standard deviation multiple of the observed control group distribution to non-responders in the 
control group. In Column 3, for example, we create a conservative treatment effect estimate by 
assuming that treatment group attriters have the mean value for the dependent variable minus 
0.05 standard deviations among non-attriting treatment observations, and that the control group 
attriters have the mean value for the dependent variable plus 0.05 standard deviations among the 
non-attriting control observations. 
Table 7 indicates that the results are not overly sensitive to adding and subtracting 0.05 
standard deviations from the means, but are sensitive to moving 0.25 standard deviations from 
the means (Columns 1 and 7). To put the magnitudes of these changes in perspective, Table 7 
also reports the treatment and control standard deviations in Columns 8 and 9, respectively (the 
treatment and control means are reported in Table 4). For business ownership at Wave 1, for 
example, the -0.05 adjustment reported in Column 4 assumes that the attriting treatment group 
has a 2.5 percentage point lower business ownership rate than the non-attriting treatment sample 
and that the attriting control group has a 2.4 percentage point higher business ownership rate than 20 
 
the non-attriting control sample. These are large changes from a base business ownership rate of 
roughly 35 to 40 percent and yet do not result in major changes in the results.
22 
If we focus on the disappearance of the 5 percentage point short-run treatment effect by the 
60 month follow-up survey, we find it would take an extreme form of biased attrition to 
regenerate the treatment effect in the long run. For the treatment effect to be 5 percentage points 
at the 60-month follow-up it would require that the attritors in the treatment group have more 
than a 0.10 standard deviation higher business ownership rate than non-attritors and attritors in 
the control group have more than a 0.10 standard deviation lower business ownership rate than 
non-attritors. 
Columns 5-7 of Table 7 also show the particular and strong form that attrition would need to 
take to create positive effects on outcomes other than short-run business ownership and 
employment. It would have to be the case that treatment group attritors have substantially more 
positive treatment effects, and/or that control group attritors have substantially more negative 
treatment effects, than non-attritors. In all, the results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that attrition 
would have to be particularly strongly correlated with treatment effects to change inferences 
based on our main results. 
 
G. Hypothesis Testing Based on Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
To shed light on various rationales for training subsidies, we next explore heterogeneous 
treatment effects in the data. We estimate these effects by adding several interactions between 
key baseline characteristics and treatment status to our model of conditional average treatment 
effects (i.e., we estimate each heterogeneous effect of interest conditional on the others). Table 
                                                            
22 We also estimate bounds using the trimming procedure suggested in Lee (2002, 2009). The estimated 
range is similar to that reported for 0.10 standard deviations for most outcome measures. 21 
 
8A reports estimates for our main outcomes. Each row presents results from a single regression. 
We also estimate average treatment effects on sub-samples of key groups to address the policy 
question of whether training benefits targeted groups in levels if not relative terms (Table 8B).  
Credit/liquidity constraints are one important rationale for training subsidies: constraints may 
prevent potential entrepreneurs from obtaining training, even if training is valuable.
23  
Alternatively, or possibly additionally, training may help recipients relax liquidity constraints by 
helping them find alternative sources of financing (e.g., microlenders, SBA lenders, Community 
Development Financial Institutions, etc.) and navigate application processes. Part of the 
coursework and counseling in entrepreneurship training is devoted to providing information and 
assistance in finding capital. If either of these mechanisms is in play, then we might expect 
subsidized training to have (relatively) strong, positive effects on the credit constrained, 
conditional on other characteristics.  
Our measure of baseline credit constraints comes from the application question: “Do you 
have any problems with your credit history?” We construct a dummy that takes a value of 1 for 
the 44 percent of the sample that responded “yes”, and either interact this dummy with treatment 
status (Table 8A, Column 2) or limit the sample to those with credit problems (Table 8B, 
Column 1). We do not find evidence that training has positive effects on the credit constrained: 
across the two tables we find only one significant point estimate out of 36 (for business 
ownership in Wave 1). We also estimate whether entrepreneurship training differentially affects 
the level of invested capital in the business for those with credit problems. We do not find any 
evidence that training affects investment, debt, or loan applications, overall or differentially for 
the credit constrained (results not shown in tables). 
                                                            
23 See Parker (2009) and Kerr and Nanda (2011) for recent reviews of the literature on credit constraints 
for entrepreneurs. 22 
 
Labor market discrimination is another potential rationale for training subsidies: if employers 
discriminate more than customers, then low-cost training may be a relatively efficient method for 
redistributing to affected groups.
24  Entrepreneurship training may allow minority and female 
entrepreneurs to overcome other barriers to starting businesses and get a foothold in business 
ownership, where discrimination limiting future success might be less than in the labor market. 
We include interactions for minority and female in Table 8A, Columns 3 and 4, and estimate 
separate regressions for minority and female subsamples in Table 8B, Columns 2 and 3. We do 
not find evidence that training has relatively strong or lasting effects for minorities or women. In 
fact, treatment effects on business ownership are significantly lower for women at 6- and 18-
months, producing main effects on business ownership for the female sub-sample that are not 
statistically significant (Table 8B, Column 3). 
Human and managerial capital constraints are another important rationale for training 
subsidies: if education or managerial labor markets do not function well, then subsidizing 
training may improve efficiency or efficiently redistribute to the most-affected parties. Self-
employment training may be especially helpful to those lacking the main human capital factors 
found to be associated with business success in the previous literature: education, previous 
managerial experience, and previous experience working in a family business.
25 However, 
estimates reported in Table 8A, Columns 5-7 and Table 8B, Columns 4-6, do not provide 
evidence that training has relatively lasting or strong effects on those with less education, less 
previous managerial experience, or less experience working in a family business. 
                                                            
24 See Borjas and Bronars (1989) and Fairlie and Robb (2008) for a discussion of customer and other 
forms of discrimination against minority business owners, and Altonji and Blank (1999) for a review of 
the larger literature on racial and gender discrimination in the labor market. 
25 See Parker (2009), Fairlie and Robb (2008), and van Praag (2005) for reviews of this literature. 23 
 
Unemployment insurance frictions are perhaps the most important, or at least most 
commonly invoked, rationale for training subsidies. Entrepreneurship training may be a 
relatively efficient way to insure against job loss by providing recipients with incentives to work 
by creating a job for themselves (and perhaps others).
26 We test this by interacting treatment 
status with a measure of initial unemployment. We find that those who were initially 
unemployed are more likely to have a business at the 6-month follow-up (Table 8A, Column 8 
and Table 8B, Column 7). This effect disappears at later follow-ups, however: we find no effects 
in the longer-run. Nor do we find any other evidence of strong or lasting effects for the 
unemployed, in either relative (Table 8A) or absolute (Table 8B) terms. The results for the 
unemployed do not change if we drop those who were business owners at baseline and examine 




Although a substantial amount of money is spent on subsidizing entrepreneurship training 
around the world, we know very little about its effectiveness and whether it alleviates market 
frictions. We provide new estimates on the average and heterogeneous treatment effects of 
                                                            
26 Another explanation for why the unemployed may benefit more from job training is that they have 
more time to devote to it. But we do not find any evidence that the unemployed (at baseline) receive more 
or different training. 
27 We define the unemployed to include anyone who is not working in a wage/salary job or self-employed 
at the time of application. Participating in the GATE program implies some level of interest in work, and 
our definition facilitates a straightforward classification of the sample into the two main categories of 
unemployment and employment (i.e. wage/salary work or self-employment). We find similar results 
when using alternative definitions of unemployment. First, we estimate both sets of regressions using UI 
recipients (which was used in the final evaluation report, Benus et al. 2009). Second, we estimate 
regressions using a slightly more restrictive definition of unemployment to include only those "looking 
for work" at the time of application. This is the definition used in Benus and Michaelides (2010), which 
builds on the final evaluation report by shifting the focus from U.I. recipients to the unemployed. They 
find stronger positive estimates of treatment effects for the unemployed than those reported for U.I. 
recipients in the final evaluation report. Under any and all definitions, we find positive effects on business 
ownership in the short-run, but no effects on any outcomes in the long run. 24 
 
entrepreneurship training from Project GATE, the largest and broadest entrepreneurship training 
experiment ever conducted. We find evidence that the training increased average business 
ownership in the short-run, but that the marginal businesses were unsuccessful and failed to 
produce tangible or subjective benefits at any of the three follow-up horizons (6-, 18-, and 60-
months). We also find no evidence that training shifts the distribution of firms in important ways 
(e.g., by disproportionately creating very successful firms) that might be missed by analysis of 
average treatment effects. Although we find higher attrition among the control group, bounds 
analyses confirm that only extreme forms of biased attrition would change these results.  
Our analysis of treatment heterogeneity produces some novel insights about the theory and 
design of training interventions. Many of the rationales put forward for subsidizing training—
countering credit or human capital constraints in enterprise development, or labor market 
discrimination—are not borne out by the data. We do find evidence that GATE’s training had 
relatively strong positive effects on business ownership for the unemployed in the short run, but 
these effects disappear by the long run. 
In all, the absence of positive treatment effects across numerous measures of business 
ownership, business performance and broader outcomes, and the estimated $1,321 per-recipient 
cost of providing GATE training, suggests that entrepreneurship training may not be a cost-
effective method of addressing credit, human capital, discrimination, or social insurance 
constraints. This conclusion contrasts with the positive benefit/cost conclusion reached in the 
final evaluation report submitted to DOL, and with similarly positive arguments proffered by 
advocates of state-level programs.
28 
                                                            
28 E.g., the New York Senate (2011) justified extending the SEA program by stating that it "has been extremely 
successful in helping individuals who are likely to exhaust their regular unemployment insurance benefits to develop 
and establish small businesses in New York…The success of this program is evident. Over 4,000 jobs have been 
created and $16 million in state tax revenue has been generated at no cost to the state." 25 
 
Our results also speak to the importance of understanding which components of training are 
more and less helpful, and for which populations. Should subsidies for entrepreneurship training 
be re-allocated to job training? Should content from entrepreneurship training be grafted onto job 
training? Are there groups thus far not identified for whom entrepreneurship training may be 
beneficial in the longer run? 
Understanding more about the effects and mechanisms of entrepreneurship training is 
particularly important given the continued growth and popularity of these programs around the 
world. Many financial institutions with a social aim now bundle business training with their 
loans. As noted above, the Department of Labor recently funded a new round of GATE programs 
in four additional states based on the findings from the GATE Project, and President Obama 
recently signed the Small Business Jobs Act which expands funding to SBDCs throughout the 
country. Individual states also continue to extend Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) programs 

























































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Philadelphia 28.7% 27.5% 0.40 26.8% 25.6% 0.43 25.1% 24.0% 0.49 23.1% 22.0% 0.53
Pittsburgh 13.8% 14.6% 0.43 13.7% 14.3% 0.58 14.0% 14.2% 0.82 14.5% 14.4% 0.92
Minneapolis-St. Paul 39.8% 39.0% 0.58 41.1% 39.1% 0.24 42.3% 40.4% 0.29 43.9% 42.0% 0.35
Duluth 4.6% 5.0% 0.54 4.6% 5.1% 0.51 4.7% 5.1% 0.60 5.0% 4.9% 0.99
Maine 13.1% 13.9% 0.48 13.9% 15.9% 0.09 14.0% 16.3% 0.08 13.6% 16.7% 0.03
Female 47.2% 45.7% 0.32 48.5% 46.4% 0.22 48.8% 46.9% 0.31 48.1% 47.1% 0.62
Black 30.5% 30.6% 0.91 29.1% 29.8% 0.65 27.6% 28.3% 0.69 25.3% 26.0% 0.70
Latino 6.2% 5.1% 0.12 6.3% 4.9% 0.09 6.4% 5.1% 0.12 6.4% 5.2% 0.19
Asian 4.6% 4.5% 0.86 3.8% 3.3% 0.42 3.3% 2.9% 0.52 3.1% 2.8% 0.71
Other 7.9% 8.1% 0.80 7.7% 7.6% 0.91 7.4% 7.0% 0.64 7.4% 6.6% 0.47
Not U.S. born 10.0% 10.2% 0.83 8.9% 9.2% 0.81 8.3% 8.7% 0.67 7.1% 8.1% 0.34
Age 42.08 42.77 0.03 42.73 43.42 0.04 43.16 43.81 0.07 43.91 44.16 0.54
Married 48.1% 48.4% 0.81 49.4% 48.6% 0.64 50.2% 49.0% 0.54 51.4% 49.6% 0.38
Has children 46.7% 46.1% 0.68 45.4% 45.1% 0.88 45.4% 44.6% 0.69 44.0% 42.8% 0.58
Highest grade completed 14.39 14.52 0.07 14.53 14.61 0.28 14.59 14.66 0.38 14.75 14.78 0.77
HH Income $25,000-49,999 32.6% 33.7% 0.46 33.0% 34.0% 0.56 32.9% 33.4% 0.77 31.9% 34.5% 0.18
HH Income $50,000-74,999 17.9% 17.2% 0.55 18.5% 17.5% 0.45 19.2% 17.8% 0.31 20.1% 17.2% 0.06
HH Income $75,000-99,999 6.9% 7.2% 0.70 7.1% 7.2% 0.91 7.4% 7.3% 0.92 8.1% 7.4% 0.53
HH Income $100,000+ 6.3% 7.0% 0.31 6.9% 7.4% 0.56 7.5% 8.0% 0.59 8.8% 8.9% 0.96
Self-Emp. at appplication  18.3% 19.5% 0.33 19.3% 20.4% 0.41 19.8% 21.2% 0.34 20.3% 21.5% 0.48
Has a health problem 8.7% 8.3% 0.63 9.0% 8.9% 0.90 9.1% 8.9% 0.85 8.9% 8.4% 0.69
Has relatives or friends who 
have been previously S.E. 70.3% 70.4% 0.93 71.7% 72.0% 0.85 72.9% 72.5% 0.81 73.6% 73.1% 0.78
Ever worked for relatives or 
friends who are S.E. 31.7% 32.0% 0.81 31.7% 31.8% 0.96 31.6% 31.7% 0.97 30.9% 31.5% 0.77
Has a bad credit history 45.4% 43.9% 0.34 43.3% 43.2% 0.94 41.8% 41.5% 0.87 38.9% 39.4% 0.79
Currently receiving UI benefits 39.9% 38.1% 0.24 41.1% 39.7% 0.40 42.1% 39.3% 0.12 43.0% 41.1% 0.35
Has health insurance from 
current employer 16.8% 18.1% 0.26 16.6% 17.5% 0.48 16.6% 17.6% 0.46 16.8% 17.1% 0.84
Autonomy index 1.7% -1.7% 0.27 -1.1% -1.9% 0.81 -0.7% -1.7% 0.79 -2.0% -4.9% 0.49
Risk tolerance index -0.2% 0.2% 0.87 2.6% -1.1% 0.27 1.3% -2.0% 0.34 -0.7% -4.4% 0.35
Unemployed at application 55.3% 55.4% 0.92 55.0% 55.5% 0.78 55.5% 54.6% 0.63 55.8% 55.4% 0.85
F-Test for all variables 0.56 0.53 0.69 0.80
Sample Size 2,094 2,103 1,758 1,691 1,563 1,475 1,274 1,176
Percent of baseline sample size 100.0% 100.0% 84.0% 80.4% 0.003 74.6% 70.1% 0.001 60.8% 55.9% 0.001
Notes: (1) All reported characteristics are measured at time of application, prior to random assignment. (2) The wave 1, wave 2 and wave 3 surveys are conducted 
at 6, 18, and 60 months after time of application.
Table 1: Treatment/Control Comparison of Characteristics for GATE Experiment





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment group
Any entrepreneurship training 81.2% 15.6 41.5% 7.3 26.1% 4.6
Attended classes, workshops or seminars 66.8% 13.8 35.0% 6.6 22.1% 4.0
Received one‐on‐one counseling or technical assistance 52.5% 1.8 18.0% 0.8 10.0% 0.6
Control group
Any entrepreneurship training 44.0% 6.6 37.9% 6.7 28.7% 5.7
Attended classes, workshops or seminars 37.7% 5.8 32.7% 6.1 25.1% 5.2
























Treatment N Control N No Covars Covariates
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.5000 1752 0.3725 1686 0.1275 0.1276
(0.0168) (0.0172)
0.5974 1555 0.4666 1468 0.1308 0.1296
(0.0180) (0.0185)
0.6761 1266 0.5662 1171 0.1100 0.1108
(0.0196) (0.0200)
0.0592 1756 0.0627 1691 ‐0.0035 ‐0.0035
(0.0082) (0.0084)
0.0962 1560 0.0916 1473 0.0045 0.0008
(0.0106) (0.0109)
0.1457 1270 0.1549 1175 ‐0.0092 ‐0.0152
(0.0145) (0.0150)
0.6285 1755 0.5853 1688 0.0432 0.0458
(0.0166) (0.0162)
0.7458 1562 0.6918 1473 0.0541 0.0582
(0.0163) (0.0161)


























Treatment N Control N No CovarsCovariates
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.4056 1753 0.3592 1690 0.0464 0.0517
(0.0166) (0.0153)
0.4307 1558 0.4091 1474 0.0216 0.0208
(0.0179) (0.0172)
0.3888 1273 0.3794 1173 0.0095 0.0025
(0.0197) (0.0194)
0.7856 1754 0.7604 1690 0.0253 0.0271
(0.0143) (0.0139)
0.8449 1560 0.8243 1474 0.0206 0.0194
(0.0135) (0.0132)
0.7834 1274 0.7993 1171 ‐0.0160 ‐0.0189
(0.0164) (0.0161)
1.4225 1631 1.8288 1579 ‐0.4063 ‐0.3691
(0.2821) (0.2880)
1.9471 1447 2.1327 1347 ‐0.1856 ‐0.1396
(0.3534) (0.3528)
2.4138 1212 2.9092 1111 ‐0.4954 ‐0.6204
(0.5385) (0.5563)
0.0852 1748 0.0722 1690 0.0131 0.0140
(0.0092) (0.0095)
0.0978 1554 0.0939 1469 0.0039 0.0020
(0.0107) (0.0110)
0.0931 1267 0.1104 1169 ‐0.0172 ‐0.0209
(0.0123) (0.0128)
10.2821 1648 10.3061 1575 ‐0.0239 ‐0.0088
(0.0319) (0.0251)
10.4061 1438 10.3708 1359 0.0353 0.0195
(0.0357) (0.0293)
10.5558 1178 10.5018 1092 0.0541 0.0217
(0.0415) (0.0353)
0.5167 1732 0.5170 1677 ‐0.0003 0.0060
(0.0171) (0.0176)
0.4938 1541 0.4893 1451 0.0045 0.0092
(0.0183) (0.0188)





























































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Annual sales and receipts
No business 61.1% N/A N/A 62.1% N/A N/A N/A N/A
Less than $5,000 9.7% 24.9% 26.6% 8.9% 23.5% 23.5% 20.6% 22.4%
$5,000 to $9,999 3.8% 9.7% 10.1% 5.0% 13.1% 12.8% 13.7% 13.8%
$10,000 to $24,999 6.5% 16.6% 13.0% 6.8% 18.0% 17.5% 18.8% 18.6%
$25,000 to $49,999 6.7% 17.3% 18.0% 4.6% 12.0% 13.7% 12.1% 12.9%
$50,000 to $99,999 5.6% 14.3% 12.6% 5.7% 15.1% 14.1% 9.9% 10.7%
$100,000 to $249,999 4.5% 11.5% 13.0% 3.8% 9.9% 11.1% 10.2% 10.6%
$250,000 to $499,999 1.5% 3.9% 4.7% 1.6% 4.2% 3.4% 5.5% 5.0%
$500,000 to $999,999 0.4% 0.9% 1.1% 0.7% 1.8% 1.7% 4.0% 3.2%
$1,000,000 or more 0.4% 0.9% 1.1% 0.9% 2.4% 2.1% 5.2% 3.0%
Employment size
No business 61.1% N/A N/A 62.1% N/A N/A N/A N/A
No employees 29.5% 75.9% 74.0% 26.8% 70.8% 72.2% 81.1% 85.0%
1 to 4 employees 7.2% 18.6% 20.0% 8.6% 22.7% 22.0% 10.6% 10.0%
5 to 9 employees 1.2% 3.1% 3.8% 1.3% 3.4% 2.2% 3.7% 2.6%
10 to 19 employees 0.6% 1.6% 1.6% 0.7% 1.8% 2.2% 2.3% 1.4%
20 to 49 employees 0.2% 0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 1.4% 0.8%
50 to 99 employees 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% 0.5% 0.2%
100 employees or more 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.1%




















































































‐0.25 std. ‐0.10 std. ‐0.05 std. Unadj. +0.05 std. +0.10 std. +0.25 std. Treatment Control
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
0.0084 0.0346 0.0433 0.0517 0.0607 0.0694 0.0955 0.4911 0.4799
(0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0153) (0.0128) (0.0128) (0.0129)
‐0.0461 ‐0.0051 0.0085 0.0208 0.0358 0.0495 0.0904 0.4953 0.4918
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0172) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0128)
‐0.0937 ‐0.0331 ‐0.0129 0.0025 0.0275 0.0477 0.1083 0.4877 0.4854
(0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0194) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0117)
‐0.0088 0.0137 0.0213 0.0271 0.0363 0.0438 0.0664 0.4105 0.4270
(0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0139) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0116)
‐0.0297 0.0011 0.0114 0.0194 0.0320 0.0422 0.0730 0.3621 0.3807
(0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0132) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0097)
‐0.1014 ‐0.0508 ‐0.0339 ‐0.0189 ‐0.0002 0.0167 0.0672 0.4121 0.4007
(0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0161) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0098)
‐1.3027 ‐0.7411 ‐0.5538 ‐0.3691 ‐0.1794 0.0078 0.5695 6.5686 9.1599
(0.2216) (0.2201) (0.2199) (0.2880) (0.2199) (0.2201) (0.2215)
‐1.6926 ‐0.7548 ‐0.4421 ‐0.1396 0.1831 0.4957 1.4336 8.8079 9.7962
(0.2370) (0.2347) (0.2344) (0.3528) (0.2344) (0.2347) (0.2369)
‐3.3971 ‐1.6728 ‐1.0980 ‐0.6204 0.0515 0.6263 2.3506 11.9129 13.8608
(0.3170) (0.3135) (0.3131) (0.5563) (0.3131) (0.3137) (0.3173)
‐0.0098 0.0047 0.0095 0.0140 0.0192 0.0241 0.0386 0.2793 0.2589
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0095) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0078)
‐0.0377 ‐0.0131 ‐0.0049 0.0020 0.0115 0.0197 0.0444 0.2972 0.2918
(0.0080) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0110) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0080)
‐0.0813 ‐0.0434 ‐0.0307 ‐0.0209 ‐0.0054 0.0072 0.0452 0.2907 0.3135
(0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0128) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0076)
‐0.1060 ‐0.0431 ‐0.0221 ‐0.0088 0.0199 0.0409 0.1038 0.8992 0.9111
(0.0210) (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0251) (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0210)
‐0.1124 ‐0.0184 0.0129 0.0195 0.0755 0.1069 0.2008 0.9425 0.9434
(0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0293) (0.0210) (0.0211) (0.0214)
‐0.1673 ‐0.0318 0.0133 0.0217 0.1037 0.1488 0.2843 0.9596 1.0113
(0.0211) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0353) (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0212)
‐0.0427 ‐0.0146 ‐0.0053 0.0060 0.0135 0.0228 0.0509 0.4999 0.4999
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0177) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0144)
‐0.0635 ‐0.0206 ‐0.0063 0.0092 0.0223 0.0366 0.0795 0.5001 0.5001
(0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0188) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0136)
‐0.1223 ‐0.0415 ‐0.0145 0.0117 0.0394 0.0663 0.1472 0.5001 0.5003




























































Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.0678 0.0046 ‐0.0095 ‐0.0703 ‐0.0235 ‐0.0258 0.0074 0.0648
(0.0413) (0.0330) (0.0310) (0.0307) (0.0329) (0.0323) (0.0338) (0.0304)
0.0374 ‐0.0035 ‐0.0442 ‐0.0670 ‐0.0044 0.0348 0.0188 0.0218
(0.0465) (0.0374) (0.0350) (0.0348) (0.0370) (0.0367) (0.0380) (0.0347)
0.0579 ‐0.0563 ‐0.0359 ‐0.0067 ‐0.0484 0.0841 ‐0.0076 ‐0.0293
(0.0518) (0.0426) (0.0388) (0.0396) (0.0410) (0.0416) (0.0432) (0.0393)
0.0753 ‐0.0038 0.0104 ‐0.0426 ‐0.0422 ‐0.0230 ‐0.0129 0.0189
(0.0343) (0.0300) (0.0280) (0.0277) (0.0282) (0.0297) (0.0298) (0.0272)
0.0736 ‐0.0114 ‐0.0083 ‐0.0237 ‐0.0151 ‐0.0118 ‐0.0234 ‐0.0083
(0.0315) (0.0287) (0.0271) (0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0291) (0.0278) (0.0257)
0.0194 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0012 ‐0.0294 ‐0.0083 ‐0.0217 0.0154 ‐0.0303
(0.0397) (0.0361) (0.0333) (0.0326) (0.0328) (0.0352) (0.0347) (0.0320)
‐1.1032 ‐0.1079 0.3089 0.6251 0.1434 0.1755 ‐0.5259 0.9747
(1.2950) (0.5433) (0.5576) (0.5883) (0.6469) (0.6321) (0.7345) (0.6650)
‐0.8260 1.3104 0.2079 ‐0.6128 ‐0.6206 0.3505 0.5270 0.4165
(1.3853) (0.9378) (0.6170) (0.7721) (0.9258) (0.7530) (0.8453) (0.7799)
‐2.8896 0.1520 1.4896 0.5986 0.1962 0.2942 ‐0.1102 2.0182
(1.9324) (1.2492) (1.1132) (1.1174) (1.2440) (1.1958) (1.2992) (1.1977)
‐0.0080 0.0150 0.0009 ‐0.0143 ‐0.0074 0.0131 0.0455 ‐0.0126
(0.0270) (0.0199) (0.0179) (0.0189) (0.0205) (0.0196) (0.0214) (0.0195)
‐0.0030 ‐0.0104 ‐0.0053 ‐0.0126 0.0052 0.0226 0.0023 0.0133
(0.0323) (0.0247) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0241) (0.0228) (0.0252) (0.0229)
‐0.0653 ‐0.0313 ‐0.0068 0.0196 0.0291 0.0282 0.0154 0.0245
(0.0374) (0.0288) (0.0257) (0.0263) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0297) (0.0268)
‐0.0197 0.0212 0.0748 0.0616 0.0302 ‐0.1052 ‐0.0567 0.0055
(0.0674) (0.0551) (0.0525) (0.0510) (0.0515) (0.0544) (0.0536) (0.0516)
‐0.0025 0.0735 ‐0.0659 0.0439 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0031 ‐0.0365 0.0160
(0.0776) (0.0671) (0.0625) (0.0594) (0.0621) (0.0646) (0.0651) (0.0593)
‐0.0314 ‐0.0642 0.0670 ‐0.0004 ‐0.0013 0.0869 0.0083 0.0549
(0.1004) (0.0799) (0.0752) (0.0714) (0.0733) (0.0742) (0.0795) (0.0715)
0.0500 0.0141 ‐0.0430 0.0162 ‐0.0315 0.0013 ‐0.0354 0.0069
(0.0488) (0.0383) (0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0388) (0.0361)
‐0.0102 0.0310 ‐0.0515 0.0204 0.0340 0.0451 ‐0.0508 0.0183
(0.0516) (0.0411) (0.0387) (0.0384) (0.0402) (0.0409) (0.0414) (0.0386)
0.0410 0.0518 ‐0.0177 0.0050 ‐0.0095 ‐0.0471 ‐0.0340 0.0016




















































Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.0461 0.0296 0.0106 0.0481 0.0250 0.0513 0.0839
(0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0217) (0.0192) (0.0244) (0.0182) (0.0214)
0.0084 ‐0.0089 ‐0.0148 0.0231 0.0386 0.0267 0.0387
(0.0261) (0.0261) (0.0243) (0.0219) (0.0278) (0.0206) (0.0239)
‐0.0393 ‐0.0263 ‐0.0036 ‐0.0221 0.0400 0.0032 ‐0.0022
(0.0308) (0.0314) (0.0281) (0.0256) (0.0323) (0.0232) (0.0266)
0.0181 0.0280 0.0092 0.0148 ‐0.0005 0.0196 0.0278
(0.0232) (0.0225) (0.0207) (0.0191) (0.0240) (0.0171) (0.0212)
0.0038 0.0161 0.0123 0.0139 0.0051 0.0106 0.0108
(0.0226) (0.0222) (0.0200) (0.0184) (0.0238) (0.0163) (0.0199)
‐0.0220 ‐0.0169 ‐0.0321 ‐0.0282 ‐0.0389 ‐0.0181 ‐0.0356
(0.0288) (0.0279) (0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0290) (0.0196) (0.0235)
‐0.3277 ‐0.2022 ‐0.1254 ‐0.2685 ‐0.1789 ‐0.5230 0.0277
(0.2938) (0.3137) (0.2811) (0.3409) (0.3319) (0.2985) (0.3022)
0.6022 0.0825 ‐0.4096 ‐0.1968 0.1230 0.0257 0.0460
(0.5387) (0.3192) (0.3178) (0.3872) (0.4516) (0.4282) (0.3756)
‐0.3933 0.1932 ‐0.5205 ‐0.5704 ‐0.4267 ‐0.6801 0.1172
(0.6813) (0.7202) (0.4374) (0.7900) (0.6028) (0.6488) (0.6404)
0.0213 0.0217 0.0105 0.0155 0.0291 0.0273 0.0084
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0130) (0.0124) (0.0143) (0.0111) (0.0114)
‐0.0050 ‐0.0038 ‐0.0047 0.0058 0.0156 0.0009 0.0090
(0.0162) (0.0170) (0.0149) (0.0143) (0.0165) (0.0126) (0.0136)
‐0.0357 ‐0.0241 ‐0.0145 ‐0.0096 0.0048 ‐0.0162 ‐0.0092
(0.0203) (0.0211) (0.0182) (0.0175) (0.0212) (0.0148) (0.0161)
0.0238 0.0404 0.0163 0.0046 ‐0.0686 ‐0.0299 ‐0.0180
(0.0400) (0.0432) (0.0383) (0.0345) (0.0443) (0.0308) (0.0351)
0.0579 ‐0.0070 0.0392 0.0335 0.0086 0.0063 0.0232
(0.0500) (0.0492) (0.0425) (0.0392) (0.0524) (0.0349) (0.0409)
0.0078 0.0344 0.0224 0.0307 0.0799 0.0285 0.0380
(0.0608) (0.0646) (0.0518) (0.0485) (0.0585) (0.0408) (0.0480)
0.0024 ‐0.0143 0.0145 ‐0.0036 0.0000 ‐0.0076 0.0102
(0.0272) (0.0276) (0.0260) (0.0229) (0.0296) (0.0214) (0.0239)
0.0246 ‐0.0178 0.0228 0.0343 0.0409 ‐0.0058 0.0150
(0.0296) (0.0301) (0.0273) (0.0247) (0.0322) (0.0228) (0.0257)
0.0440 0.0222 0.0146 0.0127 ‐0.0183 0.0017 0.0073
(0.0402) (0.0405) (0.0346) (0.0330) (0.0417) (0.0285) (0.0330)
W1 sample size 1,491 1,448 1,636 2,100 1,268 2,355 1,870
W2 sample size 1,265 1,217 1,454 1,804 1,097 2,077 1,639












































Female 0.0242 0.0410 0.0413
(0.0259) (0.0276) (0.0295)
Black 0.0843 0.0694 0.1123
(0.0365) (0.0403) (0.0446)
Latino 0.0688 0.0878 0.1027
(0.0628) (0.0643) (0.0642)
Asian ‐0.1439 ‐0.0679 ‐0.0730
(0.0846) (0.0988) (0.1129)
Other 0.0072 0.0260 0.1006
(0.0487) (0.0536) (0.0550)
Not U.S. born 0.0706 0.0498 0.0719
(0.0523) (0.0564) (0.0582)
Age 0.0100 0.0056 0.0017
(0.0098) (0.0105) (0.0113)
Age squared ‐0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Married 0.0202 0.0308 0.0485
(0.0306) (0.0334) (0.0365)
Has children 0.0267 0.0154 0.0327
(0.0286) (0.0311) (0.0331)
Highest grade completed 0.0213 0.0393 0.0446
(0.0112) (0.0123) (0.0135)
College education 0.0136 ‐0.0304 ‐0.0652
(0.0498) (0.0540) (0.0570)
HH Income $25,000-49,999 0.0232 0.0250 0.0709
(0.0326) (0.0359) (0.0390)
HH Income $50,000-74,999 0.0185 0.0199 0.0705
(0.0414) (0.0456) (0.0498)
HH Income $75,000-99,999 0.0808 0.1354 0.2253
(0.0577) (0.0594) (0.0599)
HH Income $100,000+ 0.0917 0.0795 0.0980
(0.0565) (0.0603) (0.0651)
Wage/salary work ‐0.0133 ‐0.0089 ‐0.0311
(0.0380) (0.0425) (0.0453)
Self-employed with no employees 0.0795 0.0867 0.0274
(0.0460) (0.0457) (0.0493)
Self‐employed with employees 0.0118 0.0315 0.0014
(0.0455) (0.0472) (0.0503)






Has a bad credit history ‐0.0395 0.0277 0.0369
(0.0293) (0.0318) (0.0346)




Autonomy index 0.0066 ‐0.0156 ‐0.0078
(0.0119) (0.0131) (0.0139)
Risk tolerance index 0.0174 0.0176 0.0404
(0.0127) (0.0140) (0.0150)
Magerial experience 0.0142 0.0455 0.0554
(0.0279) (0.0299) (0.0327)




Ever worked for relatives or friends who 
are S.E.
Has health insurance from current 
employer






Female*treatment ‐0.0216 ‐0.0557 ‐0.0635
(0.0327) (0.0333) (0.0352)
Black*treatment ‐0.0726 ‐0.0443 ‐0.0424
(0.0475) (0.0500) (0.0546)
Latino*treatment ‐0.0673 ‐0.0716 ‐0.0872
(0.0765) (0.0754) (0.0770)
Asian*treatment 0.1176 0.0108 0.0860
(0.1081) (0.1202) (0.1342)
Other*treatment 0.0194 0.0126 ‐0.0407
(0.0612) (0.0631) (0.0629)
Not U.S. born*treatment ‐0.1275 ‐0.0941 ‐0.1264
(0.0683) (0.0703) (0.0763)
Age*treatment 0.0090 0.0069 0.0040
(0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0134)
Age squared*treatment ‐0.0001 ‐0.0001 ‐0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Married*treatment 0.0040 ‐0.0086 ‐0.0441
(0.0385) (0.0401) (0.0429)
Has children*treatment ‐0.0196 0.0039 0.0161
(0.0358) (0.0369) (0.0390)
Highest grade completed*treatment 0.0109 0.0003 ‐0.0124
(0.0144) (0.0150) (0.0163)
College education*treatment ‐0.0352 ‐0.0327 0.0356
(0.0624) (0.0642) (0.0678)
HH Income $25,000-49,999*treatment ‐0.0554 ‐0.0262 ‐0.0829
(0.0424) (0.0443) (0.0472)
HH Income $50,000-74,999*treatment ‐0.0216 ‐0.0321 ‐0.0875
(0.0518) (0.0547) (0.0581)
HH Income $75,000-99,999*treatment ‐0.0813 ‐0.1646 ‐0.2571
(0.0708) (0.0720) (0.0722)
HH Income $100,000+*treatment ‐0.0573 ‐0.0680 ‐0.0968
(0.0677) (0.0708) (0.0751)












Has a bad credit history*treatment 0.0457 0.0010 ‐0.0225
(0.0367) (0.0377) (0.0404)




Autonomy index*treatment ‐0.0046 0.0166 0.0137
(0.0155) (0.0163) (0.0175)
Risk tolerance index*treatment ‐0.0091 ‐0.0094 ‐0.0325
(0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0180)






Has relatives or friends who have been 
previously S.E.*treatment
Ever worked for relatives or friends who 
are S.E.*treatment
Has health insurance from current 
employer*treatment

















Treatment group 51.7% 33.7% 8.5% 6.1%
Control group 35.8% 40.8% 10.8% 12.7%
GATE Services A Lot Somewhat Not at All A Lot Somewhat Not at All
Helped with applying for loans 12.6% 21.5% 65.9% 5.9% 17.2% 76.8%
Helped with deciding whether to pursue self. em 39.5% 33.1% 27.4% 23.6% 30.0% 46.4%
Helped with refining the business idea 34.1% 37.2% 28.8% 23.0% 32.3% 44.7%
Helped with credit issues 16.4% 25.8% 57.7% 10.9% 17.3% 71.7%
Helped with developing a marketing strategy 31.4% 37.4% 31.2% 19.6% 31.6% 48.8%
Helped with legal issues 19.3% 35.5% 45.2% 11.3% 28.2% 60.6%
Helped with accounting issues 23.7% 35.9% 40.4% 12.1% 26.9% 61.0%
Helped with hiring and dealing with employees 12.7% 24.7% 62.6% 7.3% 18.1% 74.5%
Helped with networking 28.7% 37.9% 33.4% 23.1% 31.2% 45.7%
Helped with using computers and technology 13.3% 26.5% 60.2% 12.1% 22.2% 65.7%
Helped with dealing with clients 16.7% 35.1% 48.2% 11.3% 30.4% 58.3%
Helped with providing psychological support 16.6% 31.0% 52.4% 13.1% 23.8% 63.1%
Notes: (1) Sample includes treatment and control group participants who received any entrepreneurship training by wave 1 





Treatment N Control N No CovarsCovariates
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.4056 1753 0.3592 1690 0.0464 0.0517
(0.0165) (0.0153)
0.4307 1558 0.4091 1474 0.0216 0.0208
(0.0179) (0.0172)
0.3889 1273 0.3794 1173 0.0095 0.0025
(0.0197) (0.0194)
0.3203 1383 0.2578 1307 0.0625 0.0619
(0.0174) (0.0173)
0.3593 1219 0.3292 1130 0.0301 0.0245
(0.0196) (0.0195)
0.3202 990 0.3125 896 0.0077 ‐0.0023
(0.0215) (0.0219)
0.2202 327 0.2351 336 ‐0.0149 ‐0.0277
(0.0326) (0.0330)
0.2667 300 0.2787 305 ‐0.0120 ‐0.0120
(0.0363) (0.0368)






























Treatment N Control N No CovarsCovariates
Dependent V a r i a b l e ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 ) ( 6 )
0.4245 1748 0.3479 1690 0.0766 0.0365
(0.1076) (0.1035)
0.4093 1554 0.3751 1469 0.0342 ‐0.0347
(0.0914) (0.0785)
0.4002 1267 0.6510 1169 ‐0.2508 ‐0.3413
(0.1651) (0.1791)
0.2927 1590 0.7609 1556 ‐0.4682 ‐0.4618
(0.1664) (0.1697)
0.6845 1422 0.7154 1314 ‐0.0310 0.0450
(0.2046) (0.1863)
0.7121 1191 1.0038 1090 ‐0.2917 ‐0.3745
(0.3259) (0.3419)
‐0.0437 1590 ‐0.0210 1556 ‐0.0227 ‐0.0203
(0.0237) (0.0240)
‐0.0244 1422 ‐0.0283 1314 0.0040 0.0056
(0.0275) (0.0272)
‐0.0589 1190 ‐0.0101 1088 ‐0.0488 ‐0.0575
(0.0278) (0.0293)
1.4426 1642 1.9168 1587 ‐0.4742 ‐0.2774
(0.3219) (0.3208)
3.2534 1419 3.3268 1335 ‐0.0735 ‐0.1050
(0.4678) (0.4720)
10.0230 1163 11.5932 1059 ‐1.5701 ‐2.4734
(3.2746) (3.4702)
1.9774 1665 2.3939 1607 ‐0.4164 ‐0.1715
(0.3750) (0.3751)
3.0215 1455 3.1941 1375 ‐0.1726 ‐0.2625
(0.4441) (0.4507)






































No Covars Covariates N No Covars Covariates N
Dependent V a r i a b l e ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
0.1262 0.1345 6880 0.1965 0.1533 1685
(0.0441) (0.0391) (0.0234) (0.0225)
0.0805 0.0697 6034 0.2579 0.2212 1462
(0.0612) (0.0567) (0.0247) (0.0251)
0.0415 0.0066 4867 0.2277 0.2098 1162
(0.0844) (0.0812) (0.0277) (0.0297)
0.0681 0.0695 6882 0.0305 0.0035 1685
(0.0384) (0.0361) (0.0208) (0.0208)
0.0739 0.0684 6039 0.0484 0.0445 1462
(0.0464) (0.0436) (0.0204) (0.0203)
‐0.0780 ‐0.0833 4865 0.0472 0.0410 1160
(0.0713) (0.0679) (0.0253) (0.0267)
‐1,092 ‐954 6415 836 561 1575
(752) (747) (476) (463)
‐236 ‐453 5560 1,248 1,285 1337
(1108) (1135) (478) (533)
‐2,087 ‐2,604 4622 2,058 2,035 1101
(2303) (2344) (751) (867)
0.0364 0.0373 6870 0.0354 0.0304 1685
(0.0248) (0.0244) (0.0130) (0.0132)
0.0146 0.0067 6016 0.0505 0.0442 1457
(0.0371) (0.0366) (0.0149) (0.0158)
‐0.0771 ‐0.0921 4847 0.0678 0.0641 1158
(0.0535) (0.0544) (0.0176) (0.0186)
‐0.0611 ‐0.0208 6441 0.1062 0.0012 1571
(0.0851) (0.0639) (0.0466) (0.0388)
0.1229 0.0616 5566 0.0396 ‐0.0447 1348
(0.1212) (0.0965) (0.0522) (0.0442)
0.2486 0.0869 4516 0.0833 ‐0.0285 1082
(0.1805) (0.1478) (0.0653) (0.0639)
‐0.0024 0.0133 6812 ‐0.0102 ‐0.0126 1672
(0.0456) (0.0450) (0.0246) (0.0263)
0.0178 0.0272 5956 0.0225 0.0063 1441
(0.0627) (0.0624) (0.0266) (0.0286)
0.0367 0.0444 3827 0.0683 0.0812 923
(0.1003) (0.1026) (0.0349) (0.0378)
Notes: (1) The first‐stage in the LATE model regresses receipt of entrepreneurship training on treatment. The second‐
stage regresses the listed outcome on predicted receipt of entrepreneurship training. (2) In the non‐experimental 
regressions, the listed outcome is regressed on receipt of entrepreneurship training. The sample includes only 
observations for the control group. (4) The wave 1, wave 2 and wave 3 surveys are conducted at 6, 18, and 60 months 
after time of application. (5) Covariates include program sites, female, race, immigrant, age, married, children, 
education level, household income, self‐employed at application, health problems, worked in family business, bad 
credit history, unemployment compensation, employer provided health insurance, autonomy, and risk tolerance.
Non‐Experimental
Log household income at W1
Log household income at W2
Work satisfaction: "very satisfied" at 
W1
Work satisfaction: "very satisfied" at 
W2
Work satisfaction: "very satisfied" at 
W3
Log household income at W3
Has any employees at W3 survey 
date
Has any employees at W1 survey 
date
Has any employees at W2 survey 
date
Monthly business sales at W3 survey 
date
Appendix Table 5: LATE Estimates and Non‐Experimental Correlations between Entrepreneurship Training and 
Outcomes for Control Group
Monthly business sales at W1 survey 
date
Monthly business sales at W2 survey 
date
Received Training ‐ No Training
LATE (IV)
Business owner at W1 survey date
Business owner at W2 survey date
Business owner at W3 survey date
Employed (bus own or wage/salary) 
at W1 survey date
Employed (bus own or wage/salary) 
at W2 survey date
Employed (bus own or wage/salary) 
at W3 survey date